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Abstract
We investigate the effect of tax evasion on the income distribution and the
inequality index of a society through a kinetic model described by a set
of nonlinear ordinary differential equations. The model allows to compute
the global outcome of binary and multiple microscopic interactions between
individuals. When evasion occurs, both individuals involved in a binary
interaction take advantage of it, while the rest of the society is deprived of
a part of the planned redistribution. In general, the effect of evasion on the
income distribution is to decrease the population of the middle classes and
increase that of the poor and rich classes. We study the dependence of the
Gini index on several parameters (mainly taxation rates and evasion rates),
also in the case when the evasion rate increases proportionally to a taxation
rate which is perceived by citizens as unfair. Finally, we evaluate the relative
probability of class advancement of individuals due to direct interactions
and welfare provisions, and some typical temporal rates of convergence of
the income distribution to its equilibrium state.
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1. Introduction
The rise of inequalities in income and wealth, the implementation of dif-
ferent tax policies and the effects of tax evasion constitute important socioe-
conomic questions for most countries. Especially in times of economic crisis,
like the current one, such issues become of major concern and are the ob-
ject of frequent studies and debates. Involving a large number of interacting
agents, as well as a multiplicity of aspects and levels, this matter certainly
falls within the realm of the science of complex systems. We think that also
mathematics can contribute to some extent to the analysis of these problems;
for example, it can help to understand the micro-processes and mechanisms
which lead to certain collective patterns. Through modelling and simula-
tions, made possible by the power of modern computers, mathematics allows
the exploration of several possible scenarios. Thus, in conjunction with the
expertise from economics, political economics and other disciplines, and suit-
ably supported by empirical data, mathematical models could in some cases
even suggest concrete policies.
Basically motivated by this belief, we consider in this paper some mi-
croscopic models of taxation and redistribution in a closed market society,
both in the absence and in the presence of tax evasion. These models are
constructed within a general framework which was first introduced in [2] and
then further investigated in [3, 4]. They are formulated as systems of non-
linear ordinary differential equations. More precisely, the systems expressing
them consist of a number n of equations equal to the number of income classes
in which one divides a population. The j-th equation (with j = 1, ..., n) de-
scribes the variation in time of the fraction, say xj , of individuals belonging
to the j-th class. The vector (x1, ..., xn) represents the discrete income dis-
tribution over the population, whose size is supposed to remain constant.
According to the findings of [2, 3, 4], in correspondence to any value µ of the
total income (which is a conserved quantity too) a stationary income distri-
bution exists, which is the asymptotic trend of all initial distributions with
total income µ. In [3, 4] it was also shown that, if the number n of classes is
large enough (n was taken to be equal to 25 in those papers) and if the value
µ is compatible with initial distributions having the majority of individuals
in the lower income classes, then for models constructed with suitable pa-
rameters (and those discussed here are of this type) the asymptotic income
distributions exhibit fat tails with Pareto power-law behaviour like the real
world distributions.
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The main novelty with respect to the models explored in [2, 3, 4] is that
we treat here also cases in which tax evasion occurs. This addition is not
irrelevant. Indeed, the illegal practice of tax evasion affects probably all soci-
eties, causing the “loss” of huge amounts of money, which could be employed
towards social and economic policies. We are especially interested in the
differences of the asymptotic income distributions in cases of tax compliance
and in cases with tax evasion. Below, we investigate these differences and we
examine how quantities and indicators like the Gini index, the tax revenue
and the probability of class promotion due to welfare change in the various
cases. In our approach the aggregate behaviour of a system, represented
by the observable income distribution curves, emerges from the complex of
interactions which take place between single heterogeneous individuals.
The underlying behaviour- and interaction-based perspective differs in-
trinsically from the traditional viewpoint of mainstream economics, whose
cornerstones are the assumption of a representative agent and the rational
choice theory. The interaction-based paradigm began to take shape dur-
ing the last decades and it counts among its pioneers various exponents
of the economics community, e.g. T. Schelling, A. Kirman, B.W. Arthur,
and M. Gallegati, see e.g. [1, 10, 13, 17]. The tool kit of researchers adopt-
ing this perspective typically includes agent-based computational simulations
and complex networks. For example, questions related to tax evasion have
been investigated via agent-based models in [6, 11, 20]. In these papers
the focus is on the effect of interactions among behaviourally different agent
types (honest, imitative, tax evaders and so on) on the changes in individual
behaviour patterns. An experimental approach to such kind of questions has
been developed and described in [15].
On another side, starting in the mid-1990s a branch of physics denoted
econophysics1 has been developed, which explores the dynamical behaviour
of economic and financial markets by means of methods and tools originally
developed in statistical mechanics and in gas kinetic theory (see e.g. in this
connection [7, 8, 9, 14, 18, 19]). In econophysics the phenomenon of tax
evasion has been described (e.g. in [20]) through an analogy with the Ising
model, which is an array, typically 2-dimensional, of spin variables sij that
interact with their nearest neighbors and can only assume the values ±1. In
the analogy each spin represents a citizen, which can be either in the tax
1 The term econophysics was coined by H.E. Stanley.
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compliant state +1 or in the tax evader state −1 and can undergo transi-
tions from +1 to −1 due to imitation and from −1 to +1 due to tax audits.
Through numerical simulations or approximations typical of statistical me-
chanics it is possible to compute the average 〈
∑
i,j sij〉, directly related to
the total evaders/compliant rate, as a function of several global or local pa-
rameters. This approach is helpful for the analysis of evasion phenomena in
relation to local interaction and external controls, but not for studying the
effect of evasion on the income distribution as we do here.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we sketch some
models, which were constructed and analysed in [2, 3, 4], and we recall some
of their features as established in these papers. In Section 3 we incorporate
into these models the tax evasion phenomenon and we discuss some first re-
sults concerning the asymptotic stationary income distributions which are
found in the absence and in the presence of tax evasion. We then explore in
Section 4 the case in which to an increase of tax rates a proportional increase
of evasion corresponds. The fifth and the sixth section are devoted respec-
tively to an in-depth analysis of some interesting quantities characteristic
of the stationary solutions and of the relative times of convergence. Some
summarizing comments are contained in Section 7.
2. The tax compliance case
We shortly review in this section a family of models regarding a tax
compliance case, and we recall their main features as established in [2, 3, 4].
Imagine dividing a population of individuals into a finite number n of
classes, each one characterized by its average income, the average incomes
being the positive numbers r1 < r2 < ... < rn. We refer to [2] for a detailed
illustration of the stylized micro scale mechanism we have in mind. Here, we
just recall that also the part of the government (which of course plays a role
in connection with the taxation system) can be described through monetary
exchanges between pairs of individuals, and we emphasise that consequently
two kinds of interactions may take place: the so called direct ones, between an
h-individual and a k-individual, occurring when the first one pays the second
one, and the indirect ones, between the h-individual and every j-individual
with j 6= n, occurring on the occasion of the direct h-k interaction. The
indirect interactions represent the transactions corresponding to the payment
of taxes and to the benefit of the redistribution. In short, and we are referring
here to a tax compliance case, in correspondence to any direct h-k interaction,
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if S (with S < (ri+1 − ri) for all i = 1, ..., n) denotes the amount of money
that the h-individual should pay to the k-one, the overall effect of payment,
taxation and redistribution is that of an h-individual paying a quantity S (1−
τ) to a k-individual and paying as well a quantity S τ , which is divided
among all j-individuals for j 6= n.2 The quantity τ = τk, which is assumed
to depend on the class to which the earning individual belongs, corresponds
to the taxation rate of the k-th class.
A suitable framework towards modelling taxation and redistribution pro-
cesses relative to such a population was shown in [2] to be provided by the
system of n nonlinear differential equations
dxi
dt
=
n∑
h=1
n∑
k=1
(
C ihk + T
i
[hk](x)
)
xhxk − xi
n∑
k=1
xk , i = 1 , ... , n . (1)
Here, xi(t) with xi : R → [0,+∞) denotes the fraction at time t of indi-
viduals belonging to the i-th class; the coefficients C ihk ∈ [0,+∞), satisfying∑n
i=1C
i
hk = 1 for any fixed h and k, represent transition probability densities
due to the direct interactions (more precisely, C ihk expresses the probability
density that an individual of the h-th class will belong to the i-th class after
a direct interaction with an individual of the k-th class), and the functions
T i[hk] : R
n → R, continuous and satisfying
∑n
i=1 T
i
[hk](x) = 0 for any fixed
h, k and x ∈ Rn, represent transition variation densities due to the direct
interactions (more precisely, T i[hk] expresses the variation density in the i-th
class due to an interaction between an individual of the h-th class with an
individual of the k-th class). The system (1) accounts for the fact that any
direct or indirect interaction possibly causes a slight increase or decrease of
the income of individuals.
To choose a particular family of models, by specifying the values of the
parameters C ihk and the functions T
i
[hk](x), we first define certain coefficients
ph,k for h, k = 1, ..., n. These have the function of expressing the probability
that in an encounter between an h-individual and a k-individual, the one who
pays is the h-individual. Since also the possibility that none of the two pays
has to be taken into account, the requirement which the ph,k must satisfy is
that 0 ≤ ph,k ≤ 1 and ph,k + pk,h ≤ 1. We take
ph,k = min{rh, rk}/4rn ,
2 Individuals of the n-th class cannot receive money. Otherwise, they would possibly
advance to a higher class. And this is not permitted in the present context.
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with the exception of the terms pj,j = rj/2rn for j = 2, ..., n−1, ph,1 = r1/2rn
for h = 2, ..., n, pn,k = rk/2rn for k = 1, ..., n − 1, p1,k = 0 for k = 1, ..., n
and phn = 0 for h = 1, ..., n. This choice, among others, was proposed and
discussed in [4].
Our choice (see [2, 4] for details) for the coefficients C ihk and the functions
T i[hk](x) is reported next. The only possibly nonzero elements among the C
i
hk
are:
C ii+1,k = pi+1,k
S (1− τk)
ri+1 − ri
,
C ii,k = 1− pk,i
S (1− τi)
ri+1 − ri
− pi,k
S (1− τk)
ri − ri−1
,
C ii−1,k = pk,i−1
S (1− τi−1)
ri − ri−1
. (2)
We stress that the expression for C ii+1,k in (2) holds true for i ≤ n − 1 and
k ≤ n − 1; the second addendum of the expression for C ii,k is effectively
present only provided i ≤ n − 1 and k ≥ 2, while its third addendum is
present only provided i ≥ 2 and k ≤ n − 1; the expression for C ii−1,k holds
true for i ≥ 2 and k ≥ 2.
Following [2], we take the functions T i[hk](x) as
T i[hk](x) =
ph,k S τk∑n
j=1 xj
( xi−1
(ri − ri−1)
−
xi
(ri+1 − ri)
)
+ ph,k S τk
( δh,i+1
rh − ri
−
δh,i
rh − ri−1
) ∑n−1
j=1 xj∑n
j=1 xj
, (3)
with δh,k denoting the Kronecker delta. In the r.h.s. of (3), h > 1 and the
terms involving the index i−1 [respectively, i+1] are effectively present only
provided i− 1 ≥ 1 [respectively, i+ 1 ≤ n].
Remark 1. We point out that, due to the bound on the income of individ-
uals in the n-th class, in the model under consideration, the effective amount
of money representing taxes, which is paid in correspondence to a payment of
S(1− τ(k)) and is then redistributed is S τ(k) (
∑n−1
j=1 xj)/(
∑n
j=1 xj) instead
of S τ(k).
To fix ideas, we take S = 1,
rj = 10 j , (4)
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and
τj = τmin +
j − 1
n− 1
(τmax − τmin) , (5)
for j = 1, ..., n. Still, the value of τmin and τmax have to be fixed. Hence, the
equations (1) describe a family of models rather than a single model. They
are well beyond analytical solutions. But, relevant facts can be understood
through simulations. We notice that, to run simulations, we take n = 25.
Remark 2. It is worthwhile observing that the choices of the C ihk and the
T i[hk](x) in (2) and (3) respectively are quite natural. In contrast, the choice
of the ph,k is an arbitrary one. We make it, because it seems to be reasonable
and it guarantees some heterogeneity in the saving propensity across classes.
The following properties have been found to hold true in [2, 3, 4]. Pre-
cisely, the first two have been analytically proved; the remaining ones are in
fact suggested by a large number of simulations.
• In correspondence to any initial condition x0 = (x01, . . . , x0n), for which
x0i ≥ 0 for all i = 1, ..., n and
∑n
i=1 x0i = 1, a unique solution x(t) =
(x1(t), . . . , xn(t)) of (1) exists, which is defined for all t ∈ [0,+∞), satisfies
x(0) = x0 and also
xi(t) ≥ 0 for i = 1, ..., n and
n∑
i=1
xi(t) = 1 for all t ≥ 0 . (6)
In particular, this implies that the expressions of the T i[hk](x) in (3) simplify
and the right hand sides of system (1) are polynomials of degree 3, see [2].
• The scalar function µ(x) =
∑n
i=1 rixi, expressing the global (and mean)
income, is a first integral for the system (1), see [2].
• For any fixed value µ ∈ [r1, rn], an equilibrium of (1) exists, to which all
solutions of (1), whose initial conditions x0 = (x01, . . . , x0n) satisfy x0i ≥ 0
for all i = 1, ..., n,
∑n
i=1 x0i = 1, and
∑n
i=1 rix0i = µ tend asymptotically as
t → +∞. In other words, a one-parameter family of asymptotic stationary
distributions exists, the parameter being the total income value, [2, 3, 4].
• The profile of the asymptotic stationary distribution depends on the
difference between the maximum and the minimum tax rates, τmax − τmin.
Specifically, if this difference is enlarged, while all other data are kept un-
changed, an increase of the fraction of individuals belonging to the middle
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classes (to the detriment of those in the poorest and richest classes) can be
detected at the asymptotic equilibrium, [2, 3].
• The asymptotic stationary distributions corresponding to suitable val-
ues of the total income µ exhibit tails which have a power-law decreasing
behaviour. Such a property has been observed in real world income distri-
butions since the work by Pareto, [16]. The condition on µ is related to
the fact that the total income cannot be too high if a tail is expected in
the asymptotic distribution. In practice, in the admissible distributions of
the population, the majority of individuals have to be concentrated in lower
income classes. Anyway, this occurs quite naturally in the real world, [3, 4].
3. Incorporating tax evasion into the model
In this section we incorporate in the model the occurrence of a partial
tax evasion. Our first natural inspection is then devoted to comparing the
asymptotic income distributions which evolve from identical initial conditions
in the absence and in the presence of this illegal practice. Preliminar results
in this direction have been reported in [5].
The case we model is that one in which, the effect of tax evasion in a trade
corresponds to an advantage for both the individual who is receiving money
and that one who is paying. (Of course, other cases of tax evasion could be
considered). Such cases happen e.g. in connection with value added taxes.
Indeed, the payment of this kind of tax relies upon invoices and receipts.
A way how tax evasion may take place may be described as follows. The
individual who receives the money (in our scheme, a k-individual), be he an
entrepreneur, a professional, a trader or similar, colludes with the individual
who is paying him (a h-individual), offering a discount on condition that this
will not require any invoice or receipt. In this way, the h-individual has the
advantage of the discount, and the k-individual will conceal his gain from
the tax return.3
In order to keep into account, at least to some extent, such a behaviour,
we recall that according to Section 2, in the case of tax compliance, when
an h-individual is supposed to pay an amount of money S to a k-individual,
what equivalently happens is that
• the h-individual pays a quantity S (1− τk) to the k-individual
3 In such a case e.g. taxes called in Italy, our country, I.V.A. and I.R.P.E.F. are evaded.
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and he pays a quantity S τk to the government.
We take now θk ≤ τk. To fix ideas, we take
θk = (1− q) τk , with 0 ≤ q ≤ 1 . (7)
We write the scaling coefficient in (7) as 1− q so as to have that the absence
of evasion corresponds to q = 0 and a total evasion corresponds to q = 1. The
effect of a partial tax evasion can be produced provided e.g. we postulate
that, when an h-individual is supposed to pay an amount of money S to a
k-individual, as a matter of fact
• the h-individual pays a quantity S (1− (τk + θk)/2) to the k-individual
and he pays a quantity S θk to the government.
If q > 0, then the h-individual pays less than he should, the k-individual gains
in the end more than he would have done in the tax compliant situation and
the government collects less than it should.
Summarizing, in the presence of tax evasion the evolution equations are
given by (1), with the C ihk and the T
i
[hk](x) as in (2) and (3), where however
S (1 − τk) is replaced by S (1 − (τk + θk)/2) and S τk is replaced by S θk for
any k = 1, ..., n.
As described in [5], we ran several simulations, with different values of
q, relative to pairs of cases with the same initial conditions, the first one
without and the other one with tax evasion.
The simulations systematically show that the effect produced by tax eva-
sion is an increment in the number of individuals belonging to the poorest
and to the richest classes at the detriment of the middle ones. Moreover,
examining the percentage in each class of the variation of the number of in-
dividuals, shows that, when passing from the straight to the dishonest case,
the increasing effect in the high income classes is larger for greater income,
while in the low income classes it is larger for lower income. Correspondingly,
those who benefit from tax evasion are individuals of the richest classes; and
the richer they are, the most they benefit. In contrast, things are getting
worse for individuals with low income: many of them even pass to the lowest
income class. The four panels in the Figure 1 illustrate the typical output.
Also the Gini index G, which provides a measure of the income inequality,
turns out to be larger when tax evasion is present. This index takes values
in [0, 1], with 0 representing complete equality and 1 the maximal inequality.
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Figure 1: In the first row, the panel on the left displays an asymptotic distribution in a
case of tax compliance, while the panel on the right displays the asymptotic distribution
for the same initial condition in the presence of tax evasion (τmin = 30%, τmax = 45%,
q = 1/3); in the second row, the histograms in the panel on the left express the difference
between the fraction of individuals in each class in the two cases with tax evasion and
with tax compliance; the histograms in the right panel represent the percentual variation
in each class of the fraction of individuals when passing from the tax compliance case to
the one with tax evasion. The histograms are scaled differently on different pictures.
For the example in the Figure 1, it is approximately equal to 0.383 in the
tax compliance case and 0.410 in the tax evasion case. If the evasion rate
is increased e.g. to q = 2/3, it is approximately equal to 0.444, and so on.
We recall that the definition of G involves the Lorenz curve, which plots the
cumulative percentage of the total income of a population (on the y axis)
earned by the bottom percentage of individuals (on the x axis). Specifically,
G is the ratio A1/A2 of the area A1 between the Lorenz curve and the line
of perfect equality (the line at 45 degrees) and the total area A2 under the
line of perfect equality. In our simulations we estimated the Gini index by
calculating the area under the Lorenz curve as a sum of areas of trapezia.
4. Proportional increase of tax rates and evasion
The extent of tax evasion in a society depends on several factors, like
for instance the strength of moral values, imitation phenomena, frequency
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of the tax audits, strictness of the penalties etc. A further important factor
which influences the decision of a citizen to attempt some form of evasion is
his or her perception of the fairness and rationality of the taxation scheme,
and the “control” that he or she can exert on the final destination and good
use of the money collected through taxation, [15]. In our model we can
simulate quite easily a situation related to the perception of fairness, namely
a situation in which the evasion rate increases in response to a sharp increase
of the maximum tax rate τmax. Notice that, in view of (5), increasing τmax
produces an increase of all tax rates τk but τmin. For simplicity we shall
suppose that the evasion rate q varies in the same way for all income classes,
but it is straightforward to turn to the general case of class-specific evasion
rates qk.
As a first illustrative example, suppose to keep τmin fixed, τmin = 20 %,
while varying τmax and q according to Table 1. For each couple of values we
compute the equilibrium distribution, its Gini index and also the tax revenue
or government budget Wtot (compare Section 5.1). Our purpose is to see if
there exists an “optimal” value of τmax which allows, even in the presence
of evasion, to minimize the inequality, while keeping at the same time the
government budget in a reasonable range.
α q (%) τmax (%)
1 20 40
2 25 45
3 30 50
4 35 55
5 40 60
6 45 65
7 50 70
8 55 75
Table 1: Example of a situation in which tax evasion increases in response to an increase
of the maximum tax rate τmax. Note that q = 0 corresponds to honest behaviour and
q = 1 to total evasion. Both τmax and q are expressend in percentual form. α is an integer
index for reference to the graphs. The ratio ∆q/∆τmax is equal to 1.
From the point of view of real economics this representation may still
look quite naive, but at the mathematical level it is far from trivial: we
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are dealing with a manifold of equilibrium solutions of 25 coupled non-linear
equations which depend on two variable parameters (plus, of course, on the
total income and on the other parameters which define the choice of a specific
model within the entire “family”).
Let us consider for simplicity only situations where τmax and q are varied
keeping the ratio of their variation constant. In Table 1, for instance, the
ratio is 1. The resulting plot of the Gini index G = G(τmax) (Fig. 2) is
decreasing: this means that, even though evasion increases with increasing
taxation, the total effect is always a decrease of inequality (accompanied by
sizeable variations in the total government budget).
2 4 6 8
Α ~ Τmax
0.380
0.385
0.390
0.395
0.400
G
2 4 6 8
Α ~ Τmax
0.90
0.95
1.00
Wtot
Figure 2: Behaviour of the Gini index G and the government budget Wtot as a function
of τmax, for ratio ∆q/∆τmax equal to 1 (compare Table 1). The function G(τmax) is
decreasing. For graphical reasons the value of Wtot has been multiplied by 100 here and
in Fig. 4.
i0.000
0.005
0.010
D xi
i
-0.002
0.000
0.002
0.004
D xi
Figure 3: Typical population variation for each income class due to the occurrence of
evasion, in cases of variable q and fixed τmax (left panel) and in cases of fixed ∆q/∆τmax
(right panel). In the case of the right panel, the middle class is split in two, and the
super-rich decrease.
If we look in detail at the population variations for each income class with
respect to the case without evasion, we note a curious phenomenon, which
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G
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Α ~ Τmax
0.4
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1.0
Wtot
Figure 4: Behaviour of the Gini index G and the government budget Wtot as a function
of τmax, for ratio ∆q/∆τmax equal to 2. The function G(τmax) has a minimum. This
corresponds to an “optimal” value of τmax which allows, even in the presence of evasion,
to minimize the inequality while keeping at the same time the government budget in a
reasonable range.
did not occur in the solutions with constant τmax. When τmax grows, at first
the number of the poor and rich increases, while the middle class shrinks, as
it happens when there is evasion for fixed τmax (Fig. 3, left panel); at some
point, however, for certain values of the ratio ∆q/∆τmax, the super-rich begin
to decrease and the middle class is split in two sections with different trends:
a middle-rich section, increasing, and a middle-poor section, decreasing (Fig.
3, right panel).
If, however, we choose a markedly different value for the ratio ∆q/∆τmax,
the behaviour of the Gini index is altered quite radically, and a minimum
appears in the graph of G(τmax) (Fig. 4). The minimum is clearly visible, for
instance, when ∆q/∆τmax = 2, i.e. when the evasion grows twice as fast in
response to higher tax rates, compared to the case of Table 1. It is natural
to ask for which value of the ∆q/∆τmax ratio the minimum begins to appear.
The numerical solutions indicate that this happens for ∆q/∆τmax ≃ 1.1. Of
course, this value does not have an absolute meaning, since it still depends on
the ph,k parameters of the model, on τmin and on the initial value arbitrarily
chosen for q in the variations (here, q = 0, 2). Yet the existence of “phases”
with different behaviour in the parameter space is quite clear.
5. Further “dynamical” quantities characteristic of the equilibrium
The equilibrium income distribution resulting from our model in corre-
spondence to certain given parameters is completely described by the his-
togram of the equilibrium class populations {xˆ1, ..., xˆ25}. This histogram can
be compared to real statistical data or to suitable fit functions, like the Gibbs
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function, the log-normal function or the Kaniadakis function (see [12] and
[4] and references therein), also in order to check for the possible presence of
“fat” power-law tails.
Some integral indices of the income distribution are usually computed in
dependence of the model parameters and allow a quick comparison to real
data. We have analyzed in Section 3 for instance, the dependence of the
Gini inequality index G on the variations of the evasion parameter q and
then in Section 4 the dependence of G of simultaneous variations of τmax and
q. Further integral indices which are usually computed for the distribution
functions of statistical physics are the average 〈x〉 and the variance σ2x. In
our case, however, the average income is not meaningful because it is fixed
by the initial conditions, and the variance does not appear to be of special
interest.
There are, nevertheless, some other interesting and peculiar integral quan-
tities which characterize the equilibrium state of our model and depend on
the choice of its parameters. Such quantities cannot be computed only from
the asymptotic stationary distribution function, but depend on the underly-
ing dynamical structure of the model. In order to define them, let us first
recall that the equilibrium state is, like in any kinetic model, the result of
a dynamical equilibrium: the number of individuals belonging to a certain
class remains constant in time when the total rate of individuals leaving that
class is equal in absolute value to the total rate of individuals arriving from
other classes. Each single rate contains in turn contributions due to direct
interaction and to taxation and redistribution.
5.1. The tax revenue
The simplest dynamical integral quantity is the total amount of tax col-
lected in the unit time and redistributed as welfare provisions. It is often
called tax revenue or government budget and it is given by
Wtot =
n∑
h=1
n∑
k=1
n−1∑
j=1
S phk θk xˆj xˆhxˆk , (8)
where xˆi is the class population at equilibrium. On one hand, it is then in-
teresting to compare this budget with the total amount of the private-sector
direct exchanges (see Section 5.2). On the other hand, it is also impor-
tant, to keep track of the variations of the government budget when different
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taxations schemes are simulated. We have seen, for instance, that by in-
creasing the gap τmax − τmin between the maximum and minimum tax rates
one typically obtains an income distribution where the middle classes are
more populated and the Gini inequality index is smaller. This does not au-
tomatically imply, however, that the total amount of the collected taxes also
increases; Wtot might as well stay constant or decrease, and this would have
significant consequences for the public sector.
Another typical case where one should be careful to keep the government
budget under control while simulating changes of taxation is that of an in-
crease of evasion following the increase of the maximum tax rate (Section
4). Supposing that some amount of evasion is inevitable in practice, we have
been looking for values of the evasion-taxation variation ratio ∆q/∆τmax
which yield a minimum G index. In correspondence to such values, one can
in principle obtain a situation of relatively low inequality even in the pres-
ence of evasion. But what about the government budget? Will it still be
sufficient to keep the state administration and welfare working, without the
need for major cuts? If this is not the case, then one should conclude that
social equality and evasion are incompatible and that the government must
in any case enforce tax compliance by introducing further audits, fines etc.
Consider for instance the case of the Figure 4.
5.2. Relative probability of class promotion due to welfare or direct interac-
tion
The probability of class promotion per unit time following the interaction
of an individual with others is given by the ratio between the money gained in
the interaction and the income difference of the classes. This probability has
therefore various contributions; some represent the money gained in direct
binary interactions and others the money gained in indirect interactions due
to taxation and welfare redistribution, represented in our model by terms of
degree 3 in the population densities xi. It is interesting to compute the ratio
of these two contributions. Suppose, for instance, that for a certain class the
total promotion probability per unit time at equilibrium is 0.15, of which 0.1
is due to direct interactions and 0.05 to indirect interactions. We can con-
clude that each individual of that class receives on the average, in the unit
time, a certain amount of money from direct economic interactions, and half
as much in the form of government welfare. If with different model parame-
ters the ratio was, say, 1/10 instead of 1/2, then we could conclude that with
those parameters the model represents a more “liberistic” society, and so on.
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Figure 5: An example of the ratio R = Pi,welfare/Pi,exchanges, giving the relative prob-
ability for an individual of the class i to be promoted to the upper class due to welfare
provisions or direct exchanges. (Here τmin = 20, τmax = 50, q = 0.3; the coefficients ph,k
are proportional to min(ri, rk)).
We can also sum the probabilities over all classes, before computing that
ratio. In that way we obtain a figure referred to the entire society, namely
the ratio between the total amount collected and redistributed by the gov-
ernment through welfare schemes and the total amount of direct exchanges
between individuals.
In conditions of dynamical equilibrium, the probability Pi,welfare of class
promotion due to welfare of an individual of the class i, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n− 1, is
Pi,welfare =
S
ri+1 − ri
n∑
h=1
n∑
k=1
ph,kθkxˆhxˆk , (9)
where xˆi is the class population at equilibrium. The probability Pi,exchanges
of class promotion due to direct exchanges is obtained from the appropriate
terms of the matrix C ihk, i.e. is
Pi,exchanges =
S
ri+1 − ri
n∑
k=1
pk,i
(
1−
θi + τi
2
)
xˆk . (10)
The mentioned ratio Pi,welfare/Pi,exchanges, computed in a special case, is
represented in the Figure 5. From this graph we may deduce that for the
very poor the welfare is an important factor of social promotion, while in the
middle classes it becomes less important, in comparison to direct exchanges.
What is quite surprising, is that the ratio stays almost constant when we pass
to the rich classes, although one might expect welfare provisions to be quite
irrelevant for the class advancement of the super-rich. A possible explanation
is that in our kinetic model the direct exchanges involving the super-rich are
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Figure 6: Time evolution of the class populations xi from “extreme” initial conditions
where all individuals are in the same income class, the class nr. 7. (Total income µ = 70;
τmin = 30, τmax = 50, q = 0.5, coefficients ph,k proportional to min(ri, rk).)
quite rare, while all the tax money is constantly redistributed to everybody
except to individuals of the n-th class (not represented in Figure 5). A more
realistic version might take into account the fact that welfare benefits are
usually not accessible to the super-rich.
6. The time evolution scale
In our model the equilibrium income distribution is obtained from the
numerical solutions of the differential equations at large times. The conver-
gence of the solution to its equilibrium value is apparent from the numerical
values of the xi(t) and from their temporal graphs. In general, the various
class populations converge to their equilibrium values in different times, de-
pending on “how far” they were from those values at the beginning. This is
clear from the simultaneous graph in time of all the xi components (Fig. 6),
where some of their lines can be seen crossing each other at different instants.
In order to obtain an estimate of the temporal convergence which is uni-
form with respect to the various income classes, one can consider a vector
norm applied to the difference between the configuration at time t and the
configuration at time t + ξ, being ξ an arbitrary fixed delay; i.e. one can
consider the function
Fξ(t) =
[
25∑
i=1
(xi(t)− xi(t + ξ))
2
]1/2
. (11)
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Figure 7: Example of time evolution for a society already at equilibrium which adapts to
a moderate change in the taxation rate. We have taken the equilibrium state of Fig. 6
as new initial condition and changed τmin to 10 and τmin to 70, all the other parameters
being the same.
This reminds of the Cauchy convergence criterum for discrete successions.
The plot of Fξ(t) converges quickly to zero as t→∞ (compare Fig. 8). The
plot of ln (Fξ(t)) in function of t is linear (Fig. 9), thus showing that the
convergence of Fξ(t) to zero is exponential. In correspondence of any small
ε one can find a convergence time T such that Fξ(t) ≤ ε. This time also
depends on ξ and does not have any special significance in itself, but it allows
to compare situations with slow and quick convergence. For instance, one of
the longest convergence times, which we could consider as a reference time for
our system, is the one obtained with the “artificial” initial conditions where
all individuals are in the same income class (Fig. 6). If we could actually
“reset” a real society in this way and record the subsequent evolution, the
convergence time would be likely of the order of years. This can be compared
with the time it takes for a society already at equilibrium to adapt to a
moderate change in the taxation rate (Fig. 6).
7. Conclusion
In this paper a microscopic model for the complex of monetary exchanges,
taxation and redistribution in a closed society is investigated, both in the
tax compliance case and in the presence of tax evasion. The focus is on the
effects of the tax evasion phenomenon on the income distribution over the
population. Various comparisons between the situations without and with
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Figure 8: Convergence norm Fξ(t) computed with ξ = 100 for the two examples of slow
evolution (left panel) and fast evolution (right panel) shown respectively in Figs. 6, 6. At
the same time, the norm in the right panel is approximately ten times smaller than in the
left panel. Due to the exponential behaviour, if we fix a threshold ε, the time T necessary
to reach it is approximately twice as large for the case in the left panel, compared to that
in the right panel; for instance, for ε = 10−4 one has Ta ≃ 11000, Tb ≃ 5500.
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Figure 9: Logarithm of the norm Fξ(t) in the case of slow and fast evolution in Fig. 8,
left and right panel. The exponential convergence of the norm is apparent.
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tax evasion are made through a direct inspection of the asymptotic income
profiles, and by means of indicators like the Gini index, the tax revenue and
the welfare-induced probability of class promotion. In a nutshell, this stylised
model supports the belief that a fair fiscal policy and a honest behaviour of
the population individuals play a decisive role towards the overcoming of
social inequalities.
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